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ABSTRACT 
Effective conspiracies are more easily formed in posted-offer and in' sealed bid markets 
than in double auction markets. A feature of double auctions is isolated as the possi­
ble source of the behavioral differences. The double auction presents conspirators with 
continuous temptations to defect. It also fosters additional competition among sellers 
for access to buyers caused by the New York rule that requires that only the (first) best
offers are exposed to the market and can be replaced only by better offers. This second 
competition can be interpreted as a coordination problem for volume allocation which 
could interact with other features of the process to undermine conspiracy. The research 
demonstrates that the continuous temptation to defect feature has its own independent 
influence which can account for observed differences. 
On The Anatomy of the "N onfacilitating" Features
of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets1
Laura Clauser Charles R. Plott 
Legislative Correspondent 
Senator Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senate California Institute of Technology 
This study focuses on a question that emerges naturally from literature on the relation­
ship between the details of market institutions and market performance. The existing 
experimental literature has demonstrated that the successful operation of a market con­
spiracy is profoundly influenced by the structure of the markets in which they operate. 
Conspiracies operating within the framework of the double auction do not tend to be 
successful in influencing prices and quantities to their advantage. However, conspira­
cies operating within a sealed bid environment or within a posted price environment are 
successful. 
The "success" of a conspiracy can be analyzed at five different levels (Isaac and Plott,
1981). Do potential agents recognize their common self interest and explore and discuss 
conspiracies? Does a conspiracy actually evolve in the sense that agents manage to reach 
an agreement? Is the agreement implemented? Does the implemented agreement actually 
influence the market? Are the effects to the advantage of the conspirators? The analysis 
in this paper is primarily concerned with these various possibilities and their relationship 
to the details of market organization. 
Previous studies have provided the following results upon which the study is built. 
First, it appears that in all markets studied to date, the opportunity to conspire is quickly 
followed by attempts to conspire. The data show that an immediate recognition of the 
potential benefits of conspiracy are not beyond the cognitive, perceptual, and moral ca­
pacities of humans in general. Somewhat surprising is the fact that the potential for 
conspiracy translates itself into an actual conspiracy in the sense that a common strat­
egy can be quickly recognized, articulated and agreed upon. Implementation is usually 
attempted but successful implementation and the success of implementation once the im­
plementation is complete are different matters. The success of conspiracy implementation 
is dependent upon the details of the market organization. 
1The research support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory of Experiments 
in Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Studies have tended to focus on agents that do not have a long term relationship or 
substantial experience in the sense of dozens or more conspiracies. Similarly, studies have 
not focused on circumstances in which the conspiracy might be enforced by institutions 
and incentives external to the market. A strong presumption exists that relationships 
involving time and additional institutional linkages can serve to facilitate successful col­
lusion. Because of this presumption, studies have focused on settings in which neither 
time nor substantial institutional machinery operate to facilitate conspiracy. Instead, 
the focus has been on the influence of facilitating devices under circumstances in which 
the presumption suggests that successful conspiracies will not otherwise exist. The ques­
tions posed address the features of institutions and organizations that make successful 
conspiracy easy and why. 
1 The Experimental Literature
Conspiracies were first studied in a laboratory experimental setting by Isaac and 
Plott (1981). The markets were (parametrically) stationary with each period (day) of 
market activity involving the same underlying demand and supply configurations. The 
markets were organized as double oral auctions with "offer improvement rules." Offer 
improvement rules (the "New York" rule) means that for a bid (ask) to seize the floor 
it must be higher (lower) than the standing bid (ask). In other words, only the "best" 
offers are exposed to the floor. This improvement rule is important, as will become clear 
later. 
Between periods (days) the buyers and sellers were in different rooms. Under the 
conspiracy treatment conditions, one side (e.g. sellers) were allowed to formulate a joint 
strategy for the upcoming period. The explicit language was: 
Except for the bids and their acceptance and except during periods 
of recess, you are not to speak to any other subject. During periods 
of recess you are free to discuss whatever you wish as long as you stay within 
the confines of the rules: you cannot discuss side payments or make physical 
threats and you can't reveal the detailed quantitative information on your 
payoff charts. Other than those specific things you can discuss all aspects of 
the market fully. 
The results of Isaac and Plott are striking. Conspiracies readily form. Some effects of 
the conspiracy can be detected in the market. However, the most important possible effect 
of conspiracies, the phenomenon that is anticipated by theories, laws, and regulations, 
was not observed. The conspiracy did little to help the conspirators. Conspiracies quickly 
unraveled and prices converged to prices near competitive levels. 
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The study of conspiracies was carried a step further by Isaac, Ramey, and Williams 
(1984) who studied posted offer markets, and by Isaac and Walker (1985) who studied 
sealed bid markets. Posted offer involves each seller privately choosing a price and quan­
tity. Once chosen neither can be changed. All offers are exposed to the buyers at the same 
time. In random order, buyers are allowed to purchase from the seller of their choice. 
In the absence of conspiracy, posted offer processes are known to result in prices that 
are somewhat higher than the competitive equilibrium and have a tendency to converge 
to near the competitive equilibrium from above. Under conditions of conspiracy, the 
posted offer process does not show such a tendency toward the competitive equilibrium. 
By contrast, under conspiracy, prices frequently approach the levels predicted by cartel 
theory and the sellers are advantaged by conspiracy. 
Sealed bid processes are similar to posted price processes. Bids are tendered in private 
and cannot be changed once tendered. However, unlike posted price processes, sealed 
bids involve the sale of only one unit of a product to the highest bidder. Conspiracy 
works to the advantage of the conspirators under the sealed bid processes. 
2 A Comparison of Institutions 
The stylized facts are easily stated. People who are not particularly experienced 
in participating in markets and in conspiracies find themselves involved in a successful 
conspiracy when participating in one type of market. However, these same people (same
subject pool) find themselves attempting to conspire but failing to be effective when
participating in a market that is organized differently. Presumably, some feature of the 
market is instrumental in bringing about the difference in performance. The natural 
question to pose is "What is it that makes such a profound difference?". 
Incentive theory and game theory suggests a line of investigation. Notice that the 
double auction presents a continuous temptation to cheat on any previous agreement. 
Such continuous temptation does not exist under posted prices. The double auction also 
presents a special coordination problem to conspirators that the posted price process 
does not. The coordination problem is related to the fact that the improvement rule 
typically employed in double auctions creates a difficult problem of access to the buyers 
for conspirators. With limited access to buyers, a seller gets a limited market share. 
Somehow the conspiracy must solve a coordination problem to determine the amount 
sold by each seller- at-any-agreed-upon price. -Under posted prices the allocation of 
buyers to sellers tends to be determined without any special institution agreement. 
The nature of a conspiracy makes clear both the nature of the temptation and the 
nature of the coordination problem. The temptation to defect is continuous. Under 
the double auction process (but not under posted offer or sealed bid), bids and asks are
tendered in real time. Since any agent is free to accept the bid/ ask of any other agent at
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any time, any party to a conspiracy has an opportunity to defect at any time. As is the 
case with any prisoner's dilemma, defection can generate (possibly temporary) personal 
gains. The opportunity to defect presents itself every moment. 
The roots of the coordination are also clear. An effective seller's conspiracy will 
place price above marginal cost so relative to competitive behavior, an excess supply 
exists. The allocation of demand at such a relatively high price is critical to each seller's 
individual profits. In the double auction, operating under New York rules, and especially 
the multiple unit double auction in which an ask can be accompanied by a quantity 
available at the asking price, access to the buyers, and thus individual sellers volumes, 
are competitively determined. Only the lowest ask is exposed to the market. Anyone 
wishing to have an ask exposed to the market must tender an ask lower than the standing 
ask. If the standing ask is the agreed-upon price, then access to the market might be 
possible only by breaking the agreement and asking a price below that established in 
the cartel agreement. A conspiracy must find some mechanism for giving sellers access 
to buyers and for coordinating the allocation of volume among sellers in some agreeable 
fashion. Under the New York rules of the double auction, such coordination requires 
much more than a simple agreement on price. 
Neither the continuous temptation nor the access to buyers (volume coordination) 
problems exist in the posted-price organization or in the sealed-bid process. In both 
posted price and sealed bid processes, there is no continuous temptation to defect. If a 
conspirator ever commits to an agreed-upon action, the commitment is final. After the 
initial commitment there is no opportunity to defect. The market access (coordination) 
problem is similarly nonexistent. All sellers have equal access to buyers. All sellers will 
be tendering the same price so unless some bias exists in the process, or in the way 
that buyers allocate their purchases across sellers, the volume is probablistically equally 
allocated among sellers. 
In a sense the existence of an access to buyer's (coordination) problem reflects a lack 
of sophistication on the part of conspirators. Conspirators do not recognize the incom­
pleteness of their agreement and do not attribute the incentive system and associated 
problems of maintaining their agreement to the incompleteness of that agreement. They 
recognize that they want prices high but they fail to recognize that higher prices must 
necessarily be accompanied by lower volume. They focus their collective attention and 
agree on one -dimension of·-the-phenomena, the high prices, but they fail to explore and 
agree upon the resolution of the other dimension, a reduction of volume. For example, a 
conspiracy that limits each seller to a prespecified volume and leaves prices unspecified 
might be more effective. Nevertheless, without volume restrictions market access be­
comes a critical issue which the double auction provides no help in resolving while both 
the posted price and the sealed bid organizations do. 
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The discussion above brings into focus the main question posed by this paper. Is the 
access-to-buyers problem (represented by the New York rule) either directly or indirectly
responsible for the failure of conspiracies in the double auction institution? That is, if the 
access-to-buyers problem is removed within the multiple unit double auction framework, 
do the conspiracies still fail? If when the access problem is removed the conspiracies are 
not successful then a key institutional feature that disrupts the cartel must lie in the 
pricing decisions themselves, the continuous temptation, the interaction with buyers, 
etc. 
3 The Individualized Seller Market Double Auction 
The experimental design used in this study involved a change in the double auction 
to allow equal access to buyers for all sellers. This was achieved by opening a separate 
"market" for each seller.2 Each seller could accept bids or tender any ask desired at any 
time in his/her own market but could not tender asks or accept bids in the market of
other sellers. Buyers could tender bids in the market of any or all sellers or could accept 
asks in any or all markets. The only overriding rules were (i) the New York improvement
rules applied to each market independently, and (ii) after 15 ·seconds market exposure a
bid or ask could be canceled. Thus, the values of bids and asks could differ across markets 
and buyers had the freedom to cancel an offer made to one seller if he/she wanted to
make an offer to a different seller without being exposed to the possibility of buying in 
both markets. The 15 second rule allowed adequate time for a seller or buyer to execute 
a transaction. 
This new market institution which we will call the Individualized Seller Market Dou­
ble Auction (ISMDA) can be used to test for the source of the organizational influ­
ences observed under conditions of conspiracy. Pilot experiments under conditions of 
no conspiracy demonstrated that markets organized under the ISMDA system converge 
to the competitive equilibrium. No tests were performed in a direct comparison with 
the traditional multiple unit double auction under conditions of no conspiracy since the 
convergence itself is the only dimension of interest. The pilot tests are not reported. 
The ISMDA organization removes all problems of access to buyers that might exist 
for sellers. Relative volume can be determined in much the same way as it is under 
posted prices. If sellers ask the same price, then buyers will simply allocate themselves 
across sellers -and--if no-bias-exists, the expected volumes of all sellers should be the same. 
Thus, the ISMDA is the double auction institution.· It is characterized by the continuous 
temptation property of the double auction but it does not have the access to buyers 
problem (the coordination problem). The ISMDA has all of the other features of the
double auction. 
2Similar market organizations have been used in experiments. See for example Miller and Plott 
(1985), or Lynch, Miller, Plott and Porter (1991). 
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4 Experimental Design, Parameters and Procedures 
The relevant experiment is easily identified. Conduct ISMDA under conditions of 
conspiracy. If convergence to the competitive equilibrium is observed, or if the markets 
have properties similar to conspiracies operating under the double auction, then a con­
clusion is at hand. The nonfacilitating feature of the double auction would not be located 
exclusively in the way the double auction determines the access to buyers (coordination 
problem) feature. The unraveling of the conspiracy would be observed occurring under a 
"double-auction" institution when only the continuous temptation property and not the 
access to buyers problem was present. On the other hand, if effective conspiracies are 
observed under ISMDA, then a conclusion is at hand as well. Under such circumstances, 
the nonfacilitating attribute would be compartmentalized as stemming from the access to 
buyers (coordination) problem. Removal of the market access feature would have been 
accompanied by a transformation of an organization from one that does not facilitate 
successful conspiracy (MUDA) into one that does (ISMDA). Thus, the study of ISMDA 
alone is sufficient to compartmentalize part of the nonfacilitating feature of MUDA. 
Four experiments were conducted at the California Institute of Technology. Subjects 
in the four experiments were from Caltech (experiments 2 and 4) and Oxidental College 
(experiments 1 and 3). Most of the subjects had no previous experience in experimental 
markets. 
All experiments involved eight people. Four were designated as buyers and four were 
designated as sellers. Preferences were induced by application of induced preference 
theory. The redemption values and costs of individual buyers and sellers are in Table 1. 
When aggregated to the market level of analysis, the individual parameters are as appear 
in Figure 1. Parameters were identical for all periods for all individuals. 
Instructions were read to all subjects. These are reproduced in the Appendix. Buyers 
were located in one room and sellers in a different room. Instructions were read separately 
to each group. Th.e delicate part concerning the possibility of conspiracy was not read 
to buyers. 
All participants were trained to use the computerized Multiple Unit Double Auction 
program (Johnson, Lee, and Plott, 1988) by participating in a stand-alone computer­
ized instruction-package which .demonstrates .the location of keys and their function. 
Accounting and other instructions were administered verbally. 
Each seller was assigned to a separate market. Sellers were unable to tender asks 
or to accept bids in the markets to which they were not assigned. Buyers were free to 
tender bids or accept asks in any of the four markets. Screen displays were such that 
the standing bid and ask were displayed in each market along with the identification 
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of the agent who tendered the action. Similarly, a history screen revealed transactions 
in each market and the people involved. Thus, the markets were characterized by full 
information about bids and contracts. Of course the redemption values and costs were 
private information. 
Periods lasted for five minutes. Two minutes were allowed between periods for profit 
calculations, and for discussion among the potential conspirators. 
5 Models 
Two models are of interest. These will be used as benchmarks against which the 
influence of the institutions can be assessed. 
The first is the competitive model. As is clear from Figure 1, the competitive equi­
librium is in the price range of [$. 70, $.80] and the volume is 22 units. Price movements 
in the range of the competitive equilibrium would be evidence that the conspiracy is 
not successful. Of course market efficiency should be 100 percent at the competitive 
equilibrium. 
The second model is that of a profit maximizing cartel (with no side payments). Joint
profits of sellers are maximized at a price of $1.00 and a volume of 16 units. Table 2 
contains the profits for each of the two types of sellers based on the assumption that 
market volume is split evenly between the two types. All sellers prefer the price of $1.00 
and an equal split of volume to the competitive equilibrium price and volume. Compare 
profits for individuals 0 and 1 of $2.43 per period on average when the price is $1.00 to 
the competitive equilibrium profits of $1.87 each. Similarly, sellers 2 and 3 would prefer 
an average profit of $2.44 per period at a price of $1.00 to the competitive equilibrium 
of $1. 7 4. These figures assume that all surplus goes to the sellers. 
A successful conspiracy that is unable to implement price discrimination would choose 
a price of $1.00. The market efficiency would be 90.82 percent. Of course, if price 
discrimination becomes possible, the conspiracy would do much better by simply "walking 
down" the demand curve. 
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6 Results 
The graphs of the time series of bids, asks, and contracts are contained in Figures 2 
through 5. Dollars are on the vertical axis and clock time (seconds) is measured on the
horizontal. Vertical lines indicate the open and close of periods. Horizontal lines indicate 
the price predictions of the two models (1.00 for the cartel model and [. 70,.80] for the 
competitive model). Contract prices in a given market are connected by a line. Thus, the
figures contain four time series lines of contract prices, one for each of the four different 
sellers, each of which is operating in a different market. Dots above the contract lines 
tend to be the asks, pooled across all four markets, and the dots below the contract lines 
tend to be the bids, pooled across all four markets. 
Conclusion 1. Conspiracies formed in all markets. 
Support. The experimenter was present and could hear all conversations. In all 
experiments, conspiracies formed and attempted to maintain a price. In all experiments, 
except experiment 3, the conspiracy formed within the first few minutes of contact before 
the first period opened. In experiment 3 the conspiracy formed in period 5. In experiment 
4 the conspiracy agreed to enforce a competitive equilibrium price of only . 70 after the 
second period. In retrospect the report could have been more precise if the experimenter 
had maintained a log of the number of seconds that elapsed before the words "fix price" 
or phrases with equivalent meanings were mentioned along with other suggestions of 
agreement, e.g., "o.k." 
Conclusion 2. In all experiments contract prices converged to the competitive 
equilibrium price range or were converging toward the range during the last few periods. 
Support. Average prices for all periods of all four experiments are displayed in 
Table 3. In experiments 1, 2 and 4 prices are in the competitive price range of ($.70, $.80] 
by the last two periods. In experiment 3 three prices are closer to the competitive range 
than the cartel prediction of $1.00 in all periods but one. Experiment 4 is interesting 
because prices never exceeded the competitive range even though an active conspiracy 
was operating. 
Conclusion 3. In all experiments volume was closer to the competitive equilibrium 
than that of -the-cartel-model. 
Support. Volume figures are in Table 3. In the last two periods of all experiments, 
the volumes are nearer the competitive equilibrium volume of 22 rather than the cartel 
volume of 16 units. The last five periods of the four experiments averaged values of 22, 
20.6, 21.4, and 14, respectively. The volume in experiment 4 is a clear exception. Close 
examination reveals that some buyers were refusing to buy during periods 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
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This might have been an attempt to collude by the buyers. The low volume was a result 
of these actions by the buyers and not the success of a conspiracy of sellers. Thus the 
data from experiment 3 also supports the conclusion. 
Conclusion 4. Conspiracies were not uniformly successful in getting seller profits 
above the competitive equilibrium. In no case were profits maintained near the cartel 
levels. 
Support. Of the 36 periods reported, 18 involve seller profits that are greater than 
the competitive equilibrium profit levels. In only 9 of these were seller profits closer to 
the cartel model than the competitive equilibrium. Generally profits were closer to the 
competitive equilibrium than cartel levels. 
Conjecture: 
variability. 
Conspiracies reduced market efficiency by contributing to efficiency 
Support. No controls exist that would permit convincing measurements to be made 
of differences in market efficiencies that might accompany conspiracies. The support 
only comes from a judgement by the authors about the properties of efficiency time 
series characteristic of other markets. Typically efficiencies increase in a near monotone 
fashion until near 100 percent. 
Conclusion 5. The continuous temptation to defect feature of the double auction 
exerts an influence capable of producing the "nonfacilitating" property independent of 
any influence of the New York rules (buyer access, coordination problem). 
Support. Together conclusions 1 through 4 lead to conclusion 5. Conspiracies 
evolved but failed to be effective even though the buyer access problem had essentially 
the same features as the posted price process. The market behavior of the individualized 
seller market double auction is similar to the market behavior under the standard double 
auction with (New York) improvement rules. 
7 Summary of Conclusions 
When operating within posted price markets or sealed bid markets, inexperienced 
people readily--Par.ticipate-in and-implement successful conspiracies. The same cannot be 
said of inexperienced people operating within the framework of a multiple unit double 
auction. The research presented in this report provides a step in isolating the particular 
feature( s) of the organizations that foster this difference in behavior. 
Two broad aspects are identified as potential key differences in the structures of the 
institutions. These are features of the double auction that are not present in the other 
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two institutions: (i) a continuous te�ptation to defect from a conspiratorial agreement,
and (ii) competition for access to buyers, fostered by the New York rules which allow
only the lowest ask to be exposed to the market. The question posed is whether the 
second of these features can account for the nonfacilitating nature of the double auction. 
The answer suggested by the research is that some feature or features of the continuous 
temptation to defect property involves an important conspiracy-breaking ingredient. In 
the presence of the continuous temptation to defect the New York rule, limiting seller 
access to buyers, has no overriding influence on the unraveling of a conspiracy. In the 
presence of the continuous temptation to defect the conspiracies unravel whether the 
New York rule is in effect (MUDA) or not (ISMDA). 
Of course, left unexplored is the possibility that the New York rule or similar (un­
coordinating) devices might have an independent unraveling influence. At this stage of 
research it is not obvious what form such similar devices might take. Posted prices re­
move the continuous temptation property and would be a natural institution to which 
to attach a new device. The device might come in the form of specialized (first-come, 
first-served) access rules with priority to the best offer. Ideas along these lines have not 
been pursued so remain available for later studies with more appropriate technology and 
theory. 
In retrospect the results reported here can be linked to other results to identify a 
possible continuity of observations. Smith (1981) demonstrated that monopoly has a 
difficult time charging monopoly prices when operating within the double auction and 
does much better under posted prices. Since a monopolist has no access to buyer problems 
the New York rule has no implications for the seller. In addition, the monopoly is involved 
in no conspiracy so there is no temptation to "defect" except perhaps from his/her
previous decisions. It seems reasonable to suspect then that the sequential nature of 
actions and information together with the possible (counter-speculative) activities of 
buyers must be explored in greater detail before the central elements of the conspiracy­
breaking properties of the institution can be isolated. 
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Table 1 
Induced Values in Dollars 
Seller Costs Buyer Redemption Values 
I.D. No. 
Unit 0,1 2,3 4,5 6,7 
1 .32 .28 1.18 1.22 
2 .37 .37 1.13 1.13 
3 .41 .41 1.09 1.09 
4 .47 .50 1.03 1.00 
5 .56 .70 .94 .80 
6 .70 .81 .80 .69 
7 .80 .92 .70 .58 
8 .92 1.00 .58 .50 
9 1.04 1.06 .46 .44 
10 1.16 .34 
Table 2 
Theoretical Profit Levels for Different 
Seller Types at Different Market Prices 
Seller Types 0, 1 Seller Types 2, 3 
Combined Combined Combined Combined 
Price Profit Volume Profit Volume 
1.22 .94 1 .90 1 
1.18 1.67 2 1.62 2 
1.13 3.14 4 3.22 4 
1.09 4.34 6 4.42 6 
1.03 4.54 7 4.59 7 
1.00 4.86 8 4.88 8 
.94 4.76 9 4.64 9 
.80 3.94 12 3.48 10 
Table 3 
Average Prices (Cents) and Values 
Experiment 
1 2 3 4 
Period Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume 
1 56 24 0 0 79 18 69 22 
2 90 15 118 1 84 25 63 18 
3 81 22 114 13 104 26 68 21 
4 69 21 104 17 86 21 69 21 
5 73 23 103 19 87 22 69 21 
6 79 19 96 23 85 21 69 11 
7 73 23 89 19 86 21 71 11 
8 73 23 83 20 85 21 69 7 
9 72 22 79 23 87 22 70 14 
10 73 19 76 21 70 20 
11 72 23 74 20 70 17 
Table 4 
Profit Per Period 
(In Cents) 
Competive Model 
Theoretical Buyers Sellers 
632 632 
Experiment 1 
Experimental Buyers Sellers 
Period 
1 1075 60 
2 291 716 
3 418 756 
4 674 349 
5 660 499 
6 675 445 
7 633 576 
8 651 458 
9 690 553 
10 607 409 
11 706 526 
Cartel Model 
Buyers Sellers 
174 974 
Experiment 2 
Buyers Sellers 
0 0 
4 86 
-15 877 
73 1030 
66 1123 
137 1053 
354 849 
443 733 
545 685 
583 641 
542 599 
Table 4 Continued
Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Period Buyers Sellers Buyers Sellers 
1 404 472 755 348 
2 245 702 663 403 
3 -187 1283 573 480 
4 392 822 714 499 
5 379 875 -57 489 
6 411 773 
7 397 829 
8 412 677 
9 363 681 
10 
11 
Period 1 
1 89.32 
2 78.88 
3 92.88 
4 80.93 
5 92.33 
6 83.70 
7 95.65 
8 87.74 
9 98.34 
10 80.70 
11 97.47 
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Table 5 
Efficiency in Percent 
Experiment 
2 3 
0 73.89 
6.8 74.92 
68.2 86.71 
87.26 96.84 
94.07 99.20 
94.15 93.67 
95.17 97.23 
93.04 86.16 
97.31 86.16 
96.84 
90.27 
4 
87.34 
84.33 
83.31 
95.97 
34.17 
59.97 
54.35 
78.16 
97.31 
97.31 
87.10 
FIGURE 1 
Demand and Supply 
14 
120 
100 
80 
francs 
60 
40 
20+ 
01.L.��+-��+-��..._�--:120-::-�-t.25::--�-;t�:---���r.;------;:40 
0 5 10 15 
units 
..... supply
- Demand 
,. I 
(/'J � 
u 
� � 
� 
0 "1" 
u ('<"\ 
.... 
(/'J 
� 
(/'J l< 
� .... J (/'J 
�� 
) ..... 
,� 
: I 
� 0 in -
� N 
= 
Q) 
s
• ""4 
� 
Q) 
c..
>< 
� ..,. 
r--
00 --
('<"\ 
N 
N 
0 � ;J 0 0 C'"'I § - - �:>!Jd r-1 ..Q r-- "' M d 
130 
104 
78.0 
8 
if 
52.0 
26.0 
... - I ...l.... 
: 
Experiment 2 - Bids, Asks, Contracts 
' • & o.ooo 43.0 890 1738 2585 3433 4280 
( .,.,._k(>._.._) 
130 
104 
78.0 
I) 
u 
if 
52.0 
26.0 
Experiment 3 - Bids, Asks, Contracts 
.__,.l-..L...�������.L_:a--����_J_����---�'--����--'-��...-��L_����-'--�. --o.ooo 89.0 839 1589 2340 3090 \)).j() 
<'h><k(><X J 
00 +.:I 
u 
� lo.I 
+.:I 
= 
0 
u 
... 
00 
� 
-.n 
< 
... 
rJl 
"O ..... 
� 
I 
� 
� 
= 
Q,) 
s.... 
lo.I 
Q,) 
� 
>< 
� 
. 
.. 
-
� -
/'. 
.. 
I : 
; 
: 
.� 
I � I 
\ . } 
I ' 
.. ;;.. :x: -r 
i 
-
� ::;;, 
: • ,=. 
! 
: • � 3': ""' 
' •  
- -
§ 
d 
APPENDIX 
Instructions 
This is an exper iment in the economics of market decisionmaking. 
Various research foundat ions have provided funds for this research. The 
instructions are s imple and, if you follow them carefully and make good 
decisions, you might earn a cons iderable amount of money wh ich will be 
paid to you in cash. 
In th is exper iment we are go ing to simulate a market in wh ich some 
of you w ill be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of 
market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will 
find a sheet labeled 'Buyer' or ' Seller', wh ich describes the value to 
you of any decisions you might make. You art not to r1vtal this 
information to anyont. It is your own private information. 
Buy1rs 
During each marktt period you are free to purchase from any seller 
or sellers as many units as you might want. For the first unit that you 
buy during a trading p1riod you will receiut the amount listed in row <1> 
marked 'first unit r1d.mption valu11; if you buy a second unit, you will 
receive -the-addi.tion.al amount 1 ishd in row <S> marked •stcond unit 
r1d1�ption valu11; etc. The profits from each purchase <which are yours 
to ketp> are computed by taking th1 differenc1 betwten the rtdemption 
value and purchase price of the unit bought. That is, 
[ your earn ings= (redempt ion value) - <purchase pr ice) J, 
Suppose, for example, that you buy two units and that your redempt ion 
value for the f irst un it is 200 and for the second unit is 180. If you 
pay 150 for your first un it and 160 for the second unit, your earnings 
are: 
earnings from f irst = 200 - 150 = 50 
earn ings from second= 180 - 160 = 20 
total earnings= 50 + 20 = 70 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The 
purchase price of the first unit you buy during the first period should 
be recorded on row ( 2) at tht timt of purchase. You should then record 
the profits on this purchase as d irected on row ( 3) ,  At the end of the 
period record the total of profits on the last row on the page. 
Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly, 
St 1 ltrs 
During tach marktt period you are free to sell to any buyer or 
buyers as many units as you might want. The first unit that you sell 
during -a- trading-·-p•r-iod you obhin at a cost of the amount 1 ishd on the 
attached sheet in the row (2) marked 'cost of first unit' ; if you stll a 
second unit, you incur the cost 1 isted in row (6) marked 'cost of s1cond 
unit'; etc. The profits from each salt (which are yours to keep> art 
computtd by taking tht difftrtnce bttwten tht prict at which you sold the 
unit and the cost of the un it. That is, 
[ your earnings= <sale pr ice of un it) - <cost of unit> J 
Suppose, for example, your cost of the f irst unit is 140 and ;1our 
cost of the second un it is 160. For illustrat ive purposes we w ill 
cons ider only a two-un it case. If you sell the f irst un it at 200 and the 
second un it at · 190, your earn ings are 
earn ings from first = 200 - 140 = 601 
earn ings from second= 190 - 160 = 30, 
total earn ings= 60 + 30 = 90 
The blanks on the table will help you record your prof its. The sale 
pr ice of the first unit you sell during the first period should be 
recorded on row (1) at tht ti�• of tht salt. You should then record the 
profits on this sale as directed on row < 3>. At the end of the per iod, 
record the total of profits on the last rCCN on the page. Subsequent 
periods should be recorded similarly, 
Market Organization 
Markets will be organiztd through the computer. Everyone has been 
instructed in the technical features of hCM they can be used. In this 
experiment, there wi 1 1  be tht same number of markets as their art 
sellers. Each seller will be allowed to sell goods in only one of these 
marKets. He/She will be the only seller in that marKet. At the 
beginning of each marKet trading period, each seller will be assigned to 
one of the marKets. During that period, that seller may not change 
markets and no other seller may sell in h is/her market. In contrast, 
each buyer may purchase units in any of the marKets or place bids in any
market. 
Conmunication Among Buyers 
During this experiment, you are not to speak to any person other 
than the person in charge. 
Conwitunlcatlon �on; St l ltrs 
Except for tht ti�• bttwttn �arktt trading periods, you art not to 
sptak to any ptrson othtr than tht ptrson in chargt. Between marKet 
trading periods you are free to discuss whatever you wish as long as you 
stay within the confines of the rules: you cannot discuss side payments 
or maKe physical threats and you can't reveal the detailed quantitative 
information on your payoff charts. Other than those specific things you 
can discuss all aspects of the market fully. 
Instructions 
Th is is an exper iment in the econom ics of market dec is ionmaking. 
Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The 
instruct ions are simple and, if you follow them carefully and make good 
dec is ions, you might earn a considerable amount of money wh ich will be 
paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which some 
of you will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of 
market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will 
find a sheet labeled 'Buyer' or 'Seller', which describes the value to 
you of any decisions you might make. You art not to rtYtal this 
information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
During each market period you are fret to purchase from any seller 
or sellers as many units as you might want. For the first unit that you 
buy during a trading ptrlod you will receive the amount 1 isted in row (1) 
marked 'first unit r1d111ption valu11; if you buy a second unit, you will 
receive the additional amount listed in row <5> marked •s1cond unit 
rtdt•ption Yalu11; etc. The profits from each purchase <which are yours 
to keep) art computed by taking the differenct between the rtdtmption 
value and purchase price of the unit bought. That fs, 
[ your earn ings= <redempt ion value) - <purchase pr ice) J ,  
Suppose, for example, that you buy two units and that your redemption 
value for the first unit is 200 and for the second unit is 180. If you 
pay 150 for your first un it and 160 for the second unit, your earnings 
are: 
earnings from f irst = 200 - 150 = 50 
earn ings from second= 180 - 160 = 20 
total earnings= 50 + 20 = 70 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The 
purchase price of the first un it you buy during the f irst per iod should 
be recorded on row (2) at th1 time of purchase. You should then record 
the prof its on th is purchase as d irected on row ( 3) ,  At the end of the 
period record the total of profits on the last row on the page. 
Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly, 
S1 l l1rs 
During tach market period you are free to sell to any buyer or 
buyers as many units as you might want. The first unit that you sell 
during a trading ptriod you obtain at a cost of the amount 1 isttd on the 
attached sheet in the row (2) marked ;cost of first unit;; if you stll a 
second unit, you incur the cost 1 isted in row (6) marked ;cost of s1cond 
unit;; etc. Tht profits from each sale <which are yours to keep) art 
computed by taking the difference b1tw11n the prict at which you sold the 
unit and the cost of the unit. That is, 
[ your earnings= <sale price of unit) - (cost of unit> l 
Suppose, for example, your cost of the first unit is 140 and your 
cost of the second unit is 160. For illustrative purposes we will 
consider only a two-unit case. If you sell the first unit at 200 and the 
second unit at 190, your earnings are 
earnings from first = 200 - 140 = 601 
earnings from second= 190 - 160 = 30, 
total earnings = 60 + 30 = 90 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The sale 
price of the first unit you sell during the first period should be 
recorded on row (1) at tht ti�t of tht salt. You should then record the 
profits on this sale as directed on row ( 3) .  At the end of the period, 
record the total of profits on the last row on the page. Subsequent 
periods should be rtcorded similarly, 
Market Organization 
Markets will be organized through the cornputer. Everyone has been 
instructed in the technical features of how thtY can be used. In this 
experiment, there will bt tht same number of markets as thtir are 
sellers. Each seller will bt allowtd to sell goods in only one of thtst 
markets. He/She will be the only seller in that market. At the 
beginning of each market trading period, each seller will be assigned to 
one of the markets. During that period, that seller may not change 
markets and no other seller may sell in his/her market. In contrast, 
each buyer may purchase units in any of the markets or place bids in any 
market. 
Ccnmunication Among Buyers 
During this experiment, you are not to speak to any person other 
than the person in charge. 
Connunlcatlon Anlong Stlltrs 
Except for tht ti�• b1t�11n �arktt trading periods, you are not to 
sptak to any p1rson othtr than tht ptrson in chargt. Between market 
trading periods you are free to discuss whatever you wish as long as you 
stay within the confines of the rules: you cannot discuss side payments 
or make physical threats and you can't reveal the detailed quantitative 
information on your payoff charts. Othtr than those sptcific things you 
can discuss all aspects of the market fully. 
